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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20020337-CA 
v. : 
STEVE HARRIS, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeaf from a conviction for aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1999), with a dangerous weapon enhancement, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1999), in the Second Judicial District Court in and 
for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, presiding. This court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether allowing the prosecutor's demonstration in closing argument inferring 
that defendant wore a black cap and bandanna during the burglary constituted plain error? 
m reviewing a claim of plain error, this Court must determine whether defendant has 
demonstrated that "(1) an error exists, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court, and (3) the error prejudiced him." State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, [^48, 25 P.2d 985 
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). 
2. Whether this Court should review an inadequately briefed claim, that the 
prosecutor improperly mentioned the victim's daughter's injuries, under the plain error 
standard? 
An appellate court will decline to review challenges to a trial court's findings where 
a defendant has failed to marshal supporting evidence, failed to adequately brief, failed to 
provide an adequate record on appeal, or has invited the error asserted. See State v. Thomas, 
961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998) (declining to review inadequately briefed claim of error). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are determinative of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1999), and one count of aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999) (R. 1-2). A 
dangerous weapon enhancement under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 2002) applied to 
both charges (R. 1-2). A jury found defendant guilty of aggravated burglary and of using a 
dangerous weapon during the commission of the offense (R. 122-23; 170:55). The trial court 
sentenced defendant to a statutory term of six-years-to-life in prison (R. 141-42, 171:15). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 145). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 2002) (R. 148-49). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
In the early morning hours of May 11,2001, defendant broke into his estranged wife's 
apartment and beat her viciously with a baseball bat. 
Background 
Defendant and Alicia Harris, the victim, were married in April 1997 and lived in 
Ogden, Utah after July 1997 (R. 167:30). They have two children together, a daughter, 
Mikaela, and a son, Matthew, who were respectively four and one-half and three-years-old 
at the time of the attack (R. 169:121). On March 2, 2001, after failed attempts at 
reconciliation with defendant, Alicia filed for divorce and changed the locks on her 
apartment (R. 167:32-34). Defendant was distressed and upset at being locked out of the 
apartment (R. 169:181). He moved into the basement of his parents' home about four to five 
minutes away from Alicia's apartment (R. 169:122-23, 232). 
The only disputed issue in the divorce settlement was custody of the children (R. 
167:35; 169: 126). Alicia wanted defendant to only have standard visitation rights of every 
other weekend and one week night per week (R. 167:36-37). Defendant wanted joint custody 
and no obligation to pay child support (R. 167:37; 169:126). During their separation, 
defendant had refused to return the children after a visit on at least one occasion (R. 167:37). 
On that same occasion, defendant verbally abused Alicia, calling her a "cunt" (R. 167:38). 
1
 The facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are recited in a light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ^|2, 25 P.3d 985. 
3 
On May 7, 2001, defendant and Alicia attended a custody mediation session (R. 
167:35; 169:126). During the mediation, defendant became aggressive and used a 
threatening tone of voice (R. 167:38). No agreement was reached at the mediation, and the 
couple decided to hire a custody evaluator (R. 167:38; 169:130). The following Thursday, 
May 10, 2001, defendant took the children for a few hours pursuant to a scheduled visit (R. 
167:39). He returned the children to Alicia's apartment at 7:30 p.m. (R. 167:39). Defendant 
and Alicia were cordial to each other at that encounter (R. 167:39; 169:138). Alicia put the 
children to bed at 9:00 p.m., and retired at 10:30 p.m. (R. 167:39). At about 3:00 a.m., 
Mikaela came into Alicia's room and climbed into bed (R. 167:40). 
The Burglary and Assault 
Alicia woke up the next morning at about 5:15 a.m. and took a five or ten minute 
shower (R. 167:44). She walked from the shower back to her bedroom in a towel (R. 
167:44). The only light came from the bathroom, which left her bedroom dark (R. 167:45). 
When she entered the bedroom, she saw the silhouette of a tall figure, and she turned on the 
bedroom light (R. 167:45). Alicia saw that the silhouette was a person dressed in a black 
sweatshirt and his "face [was] covered in black" (R. 167:46). She thought that she might 
have seen his teeth, and she later told officers that he was wearing a black knit ski mask with 
one mouth and two eye holes (R. 167:46, 84). The person struck her on the head with a 
baseball bat (167:47, 72-73; 168:239). Alicia tried to shield herself with her hand, but her 
assailant hit her hand two or three times, breaking it (R. 167:50-51). Alicia dropped to ? r 
knees as her assailant hit her ten to fifteen more times on the neck, shoulders, and back
 { ;<. 
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167:52).2 While on the floor, Alicia noticed that her assailant was wearing white tennis shoes 
with blue trim and black jeans (167:53-54). Mikaela woke up and cried out, and Alicia 
yelled at her assailant to stop (R. 167:55). The assailant fled the bedroom and ran down the 
stairs to the main floor of the apartment (R. 167:55-56). Alicia later surmised that her 
assailant fled out the sliding glass door at the back of the apartment because the front door 
was still locked from the inside (167:56). 
Alicia crawled down the stairs and called the police (R. 167:60-62). She told the 
dispatch operator that she had been attacked by her husband and gave the operator his 
address and a description of his vehicle (R. 167:62). The police were dispatched at 5:34 a.m. 
and arrived at Ahcia's apartment shortly thereafter (J 67;J 36). Medwa) personnel checked 
Alicia for injuries and transported her to the hospital (R. 167:64). While waiting for the 
police, Alicia noticed that her sliding glass door was shattered, but still intact in the door 
frame (167:58). The door was open and a hole was punched through the glass near the 
handle (R. 167:59, 143; 168:298). 
From the beginning, Alicia believed that defendant was her assailant (R. 167:49). She 
based her belief on the similarity of defendant's and her assailant's "size, stature, and build 
(both about 6*2" and 160 pounds) - - "[wjhen you've been married to someone for so long 
you just know." Her assessment was also based on the tennis shoes and pants that her 
assailant; wore (R. 167:49-50,91-95,130). She testified that defendant had a couple of pairs 
of black jeans (167:53-54, 91-92). She also identified the blue-striped Reebok tennis shoes 
2
 Evidence of Alicia's multiple head, back, and hand injuries were mainly 
presented to the jury through photographs (R. 167:65-66, 71). 
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worn by defendant when he was apprehended as those typically worn by him and like those 
worn by her assailant (R. 53-54, 91-92, 95, 131; State's Ex. 24). 
Alicia also believed defendant was her assailant because of the difficulties they were 
having over custody of their children - - "I felt he was the only one capable of doing 
something like that to me" - - and she had no other enemies (R. 167:95-96). Alicia was 
unable to see any of her assailant's facial features, and her assailant never spoke during the 
attack (R. 167:97). She also conceded that her assailant was not wearing eyeglasses and that 
defendant has trouble seeing without his glasses, although he could get around the apartment 
without them (R. 167:98, 119-21; 168:253-54). However, she remained convinced that 
defendant assaulted her and identified defendant as her assailant at trial (R. 167:49, 126; 
168:254). 
The Gatorade Bottle 
After Alicia was transported to the hospital, Officer Khoury visited with Mikaela in 
Alicia's bedroom (R. 168:16). Mikaela was calm and did not appear upset (R. 168:17). In 
response to questions about what had happened, Mikaela stated, "Mommy hurt her back," 
and "I saw blood on her back" (R. 168:18). Mikaela said she did not see how Alicia hurt her 
back, but that she saw "the ambugance [sic] slapping her" (R. 168:18). 
Mikaela then stated that she was thirsty and wanted a drink (R. 168:20). Officer 
Khoury didn't want Mikaela to leave the bedroom, so she retrieved a bottle of Gatorade lying 
on its side approximately three feet from the doorway (R. 168:20). Mikaela took a drink 
from the Gatorade bottle and within a few seconds of swallowing began "screaming bloody 
6 
murder" and holding her ears (R. 168:21). Officer Khoury calmed Mikaela and had her lie 
on the bed (R. 168: 21). Mikaela began to vomit, and Officer Khoury determined that 
Mikaela was having an adverse reaction to the fluid in the Gatorade bottle (R. 168:21-22). 
Medical personnel transported Mikaela to the hospital. Mikaela suffered burns to her mouth, 
esophagus, and stomach (R. 168:22, 243). A subsequent analysis of the contents of the 
Gatorade bottle at the Utah State Crime indicated that the fluid was not Gatorade, but sodium 
hydroxide (R. 169:36-41). Sodium hydroxide is a caustic substance common to drain 
cleaners (R. 169:60, 71). At trial, Alicia testified that at the time of the attack there was no 
Gatorade in the apartment, including the bedroom, and she had not purchased Gatorade for 
six months (R. 167:67-68). 
The Police Investigation 
Police arrived at defendant's home at approximately 5:46 a.m. the morning of the 
attack, within minutes after dispatch (R. 167:39). Defendant's car, a 1996 Toyota Avalon, 
was parked in front of his house. Officer Trujillo testified that the hood of the car was so hot 
that he could not leave his hand on it and that the engine was making popping noises, 
indicating the car had recently been driven (R. 168:41-42).3 Officer Trujillo also noticed a 
black wool knit hat, a blue and white checkered bandana, and pair of white, blue and yellow 
Reebok running shoes in the back of defendant's vehicle (R. 168:42). Defendant exited his 
3
 Steve Finny, a witness for the State and a Toyota auto technician and service 
writer, testified that a pinging noise is common for a few minutes after a car is driven (R. 
169:218). The sound is indicative of the engine changing temperature as it cools off and 
usually lasts for no more than ten or fifteen minutes (R. 169:219). He also stated that a 
recently driven vehicle will have a warm hood for no longer than half an hour (R. 
169:220). 
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house and greeted officers in his front yard before they reached the front door (R. 16.8:45). 
Defendant's hair was towel dried and freshly combed (R. 168:45). When told that he was 
under arrest, defendant responded, "What is it this time?" (R. 168:46). He indicated that his 
wife was "always calling the police on him" (R. 168:46).4 When asked about the popping 
noises from his engine and the hot hood of his car, defendant stated that he had gone to the 
store about an hour earlier and the sound was probably due to the catalytic converter (R. 
168:48-49).5 Officer Secrist read defendant his rights, handcuffed him, and transported him 
to the police station for questioning (R. 168:78). 
Officers obtained defendant's consent to search his vehicle and his apartment (R. 
168:49). During the search, Officer Trujillo recovered the black cap, bandana, and shoes 
from defendant's vehicle (R. 168:50-51). He also noticed, but did not seize, a black hooded 
sweatshirt in defendant's apartment (R. 168:52). Defendant's vehicle was later searched 
pursuant to a warrant, and officers recovered some glass fragments on the driver's side floor 
mat, a pair of black gloves, a derogatory note to his wife, and a bottle of Red Devil Lye, a 
4
 Ogden police records indicate that police have responded to calls from 
defendant's wife only four times since 1997 (R. 169:188). Those calls were (1) for a 
storage shed burglary unrelated to the couple's domestic troubles; (2) for a check on 
defendant's well-being; (3) to keep the peace while defendant retrieved his possessions 
from Alicia's apartment; and (4) for custodial interference when defendant failed to return 
the children on time (R. 169:188-89). 
5
 Steve Finny testified that the catalytic converter uses the engine's heat to burn 
exhaust, but that it has no effect on the length of time that the engine stays warm (R. 
169:217-18). 
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drain opener (R. 168:177-78, 202-04, 210, 221).6 When defendant saw the officers retrieve 
the Red Devil Lye from his car, he exclaimed, 'The drains in my house plug up" (R. 
168:204). 
The Utah State Crime Lab compared the sodium hydroxide in the Gatorade bottle and 
the contents of the Red Devil Lye found in defendant's car and determined that they were 
identical (R. 169:41-42). Other usual crime scene investigation techniques such as 
fingerprint analysis and blood DNA analysis revealed nothing connecting defendant to the 
attack (R. 168:265, 269, 270-71, 276; 169:15-18). The glass shards found in defendant's 
vehicle did not match the glass shards from Alicia's sliding glass door (R. 169:51). Mikaela 
told Detective Croyle that her daddy was not her mother's assailant (R. 168:255). 
Defendant's Statements 
Defendant made a statement at the police station in which he claimed that on the 
morning of May 11, 2001, he woke up at three or four a.m. and drove, no later than 5:00 
a.m., to a Chevron station to get a two-liter bottle of Diet Coke (R. 168:83, 139). When he 
returned, he watched the movie, "Independence Day," until 5:30 a.m., at which point he 
showered and got ready for work (R. 168:84). Defendant first claimed in his statement that 
he went to a Chevron on 12th and Harrison in Ogden (R. 168:85). He later confirmed this to 
Detective Croyle and stated that he had used the drive-through at that Chevron (R: 168:125). 
6
 The warrant search was conducted later in the day, and separately from the 
consent search. At the time, defendant had already been transported to the police station, 
questioned, and returned to his home (R. 168:199-202). The note to Alicia was written in 
February and read, "I would rather sleep with a wolverine and butt hump a polar bear 
than kiss Alicia Harris again" (R. 169:183). 
9 
Defendant could not describe the clcr k who helped him or even give the clerk's gender (R. 
168:125-26,136). But, defendant described in detail the route he took from his house to the 
Chevron and back and described what bills he used to pay for the Coke and the change he 
received (R. 168:136-37). 
The Chevron that defendant described did not open until 5:30 a.m.; the manager, on 
duty alone, did not recall selling any Diet Coke between 5:30 and 5:45 a.m.; and the store's 
register tape recorded the first sale of the day at 5:46 a.m. (R. 168:139, 193-95). At trial, 
defendant repeated his story, but this time claimed that he went to the 24-hour Chevron at 
21st and Harrison (R. 169:140,143-44). Ho we ver, photographs supported Detective Croyle's 
testimony that the second Chevron does not have a drive-through window (R. 169:97). 
Defendant discussed with officers his relationship with Alicia (R. 168:80, 124). He 
told Officer Secrist and Detective Croyle that he loved Alicia and wanted to reconcile with 
her (R. 168:80,125). However, the first time defendant asked about Alicia's condition was 
during the drive to the police station with Officer Secrist (168:80). 
After giving a statement, defendant was questioned by Detective Croyle (R. 168:121). 
During the questioning, Detective Croyle mentioned the Gatorade bottle and the injuries 
Mikaela sustained while drinking from it (R. 168:130). She told defendant that doctors 
needed to know what was in the bottle in order to treat Mikaela and asked defendant what 
was in the bottle (R. 168:130-31). Defendant began arguing loudly that he didn't know 
anything about the bottle, and he repeatedly and adamantly stated that he had no Drano or 
any other kind of drain cleaner (R. 168:131-32). Shortly afterward, defendant withdrew his 
10 
consent to a further search of his car, in which the bottle of Red Devil Lye was found later 
that day (R. 168:163-64,202-03). While en route with detectives to his apartment, defendant 
also withdrew his consent to search those premises (R. 168:199-200). 
Defendant was also interviewed by Betty Meyer, foster care worker with the Division 
of Child and Family Services, on May 31,2001, several weeks after the assault (169:72-74). 
During the interview, defendant remarked about Alicia's accusing him of being her assailant, 
stating, "[S]omeone came in with a mask and attacked[ Alicia], she's saying it was me, but 
she never saw me" (R. 169:78). Based on defendant's tone of voice and agitated state, Ms. 
Meyer clearly understood defendant to mean that Alicia correctly accused him even though 
she was unable to see through his disguise (R. 169:77-78). 
On the foregoing evidence, the jury convicted defendant of aggravated burglary (R. 
170:55). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The prosecutor's demonstration constituted a reasonable inference from the evidence 
of how the victim's assailant's face was actually covered during the burglary, thus refuting 
defendant's plain error claim. The victim variously testified that her assailant's face "was 
covered in black," or that he wore a black knit ski mask through which she saw his eyes and 
teeth. No ski mask was ever found. However, on the morning of the burglary, police found 
in defendant's car a black knit cap and a blue and white checkered bandanna, which 
defendant acknowledged were his. During rebuttal closing argument, co-counsel for the 
11 
State wore the cap and bandanna to suggest they were the assailant's actual facial covering. 
Even though the victim did not explicitly state that the cap/bandana combination could have 
been the disguise she observed, the State's demonstration was a reasonable inference from 
evidence properly admitted without objection. 
POINT II 
The Court should decline to consider defendant's claim that the prosecutor improperly 
elicited testimony and then commented in closing argument about the victim's daughter's 
injuries from drinking sodium hydroxide from a Gatorade bottle left by defendant 
Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error in allowing the prosecutor to elicit 
and discuss this evidence of his prior bad acts under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
However, defendant has entirely failed to identify and apply the criteria painstakingly crafted 
by Utah's appellate courts for determining whether alleged prior bad act evidence has been 
properly admitted. The State provides a brief analysis showing that the evidence was 
properly admitted because it was highly relevant to defendant's identification, the only 
genuinely disputed issue at trial. In any event, any error was harmless because evidence of 




BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR'S DEMONSTRATION IN CLOSING 
ARGUMENT INFERRING THAT DEFENDANT WORE A BLACK 
CAP AND BANDANNA DURING THE BURGLARY WAS A 
REASONABLE INFERENCE FROM THE EVIDENCE, DEFENDANT 
HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT ALLOWING THE 
DEMONSTRATION WAS PLAIN ERROR 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his rebuttal 
argument by introducing new evidence. Specifically, he asserts that the prosecutor 
improperly demonstrated with his co-counsel how the black cap and checkered bandana 
found in defendant's vehicle could be worn to cover up the face in a manner similar to a ski 
mask, a theory the victim did not expressly testify to. Aplt. Br. at 14, 20-21. Because 
defense counsel failed to object, defendant asserts that the trial court committed plain error 
in not sua sponte stopping the prosecutor's demonstration. Aplt. Br. at 24. 
Defendant's claims fail because he has failed to meet any of the requirements of the 
plain error rule. The prosecutor's demonstration was an inference consistent with the 
victim's testimony and properly admitted physical evidence. 
A. The prosecutor's demonstration was a reasonable inference from the 
evidence that in the taut circumstances of her encounter, the victim 
actually saw defendant wearing a black wool knit cap and blue and white 
checkered bandana, rather than a black wool knit ski mask with eye and 
mouth holes. 
1. Factual background. 
In answer to the prosecutor's question about what she saw when she turned on the 
bedroom light, Alicia Harris first answered: "I saw someone standing in front of me. I saw 
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a face covered in black, I saw his eyes, I thought I saw his teeth" (R. 167:46). On cross-
examination, she testified that approximately thirty to forty-five minutes after having been 
beaten, she told Officer Skinner that her assailant wore a black full-faced ski mask with one 
mouth and two eye holes (R. 167:84). When defense counsel again sought to have the victim 
commit to her assailant's wearing a ski mask, Alicia acknowledged her original report to 
Officer Skinner and again stated that, "I thought I could see his eyes and his teeth, yes" (R. 
167:85). 
Police officers conducted both a consent search of defendant's apartment and vehicle 
and a warrant search of his vehicle (R. 168:49,120-21,157,176). Neither search uncovered 
a ski mask (R. 168:66, 176). However, the consent search of defendant's vehicle yielded, 
among other incriminating items, a black wool knit hat and a blue and white checkered 
bandana (R. 168:42). These items, which the police considered relevant, were received into 
evidence without objection (State's Exhibits 26 and 27; R. 133,168:50,147-49; 169:82-83). 
During his rebuttal to defense counsel's closing argument, the prosecutor, Mr. 
Heward, mentioned to the jury that the defense had pointed out that officers never found a 
ski mask belonging to defendant (R. 170:51). He then asked the jury to "engage in an 
exercise" with him and to close their eyes and place themselves in Alicia Harris' shoes (R. 
170:51; Video of Closing Arguments at 10:05:28). While the jury apparently had their eyes 
closed, Mr. Smith, the State's co-counsel, placed the black cap on his head and tied the 
bandana around his face (Video of Closing Arguments at 10:06:00). Mr. Smith then stood 
next to Mr. Heward in front of the jury, when Mr. Heward instructed the jury to open their 
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eyes (R. 170:5.1; Video of Closing Arguments at 10:06:37). As the jury opened their eyes, 
Mr. He ward asked, "What do you see in front of you? What do you see in front of you? Do 
you see a knit ski mask with two eye holes and a mouth hole or teeth? What do you see?" (R. 
168:51-52; Video of Closing Arguments at 10:06:37). Mr. Smith then removed the cap and 
bandana and sat down, and Mr. Heward continued with his rebuttal (Video of Closing 
Arguments at 10:06:55). 
2. The prosecutor's reasonable inferences did not 
constitute prosecutorial misconduct. 
To establish prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show that a "prosecutor's 
remarks were improper and harmful to defendant." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^  61, 55 
P.3d 573. "A prosecutor's remarks will be considered improper if the remarks 'called to the 
juror's attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in reaching a 
verdict."'Id. (quotingState v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781,785 (Utah 1992)). "Improper remarks 
will be deemed harmful if the jury was, 'under the circumstances of the particular case, 
probably influenced by those remarks.'" Id. (quoting State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483,486 (Utah 
1984)). "A prosecutor's statements [are] harmful if they manifest error that 'is substantial 
and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would 
have been a more favorable result.'" State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, t 22, 999 P.2d 7 (citation 
omitted). In deciding whether the statements were harmful, it is proper to consider the 
evidence of defendant's guilt and whether that evidence is compelling. See Emmett, 839 P.2d 
at 786; Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. 
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Additionally, to prove plain error defendant must show not only that an error exists, 
but also that "the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and[that] the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome 
for the appellant...." State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, f 7,4 P.2d 778 (quoting State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). In other words, defendant must show that the 
prosecutor's closing argument was so obviously improper that the trial court was required 
to sua sponte intervene. 
Defendant mainly complains that the prosecutor's demonstration in summation was 
beyond the evidence introduced at trial because the victim did not expressly affirm the 
possibility that her assailant's face might have been covered by the black hat/checkered 
bandanna combination. Aplt. Br. at 14. 
"Counsel for both sides have considerable]... freedom in closing argument." State 
v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,1284 (Utah 1989). "'Counsel may appeal to the jury with all the 
power and persuasiveness his learning, skill and experience enable him to use.'" State v. 
Diaz, 2002 UT App. 288, f 51, 55 P.3d 1131 (citation omitted). "'[I]n summing up a case 
before a jury, counsel may not introduce or comment on facts outside the evidence, but 
reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence and considerable latitude is allowed 
in discussing it.'" Id. See also State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, \ 57, 979 P.2d 799 ("[A] 
prosecutor may draw permissible deductions from the evidence and make assertions about 
what the jury may reasonably conclude from those deductions.") (citing State v. Parsons, 781 
P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989)). Also, the prosecutor "has both the duty and prerogative to 
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analyze what the evidence does or does not show," and he may present a "common-sense 
observation of a fact that the jurors themselves could not fail to notice." State v. White, 577 
P.2d 552, 555 (Utah 1978). 
While no Utah case is precisely on point, other jurisdictions have consistently upheld 
a prosecutor's reasonable inference in closing even though the relevant witness failed to 
expressly testify in support of the inference.7 
In State v. England, 376 S.E.2d 548 (W. Va. 1988), a man wearing a ski mask robbed 
a service station at gunpoint and escaped in a pick-up truck. Id. at 542. The robber's 
identity was the central issue at trial, focusing on his shoes and the defendant's ownership 
of the truck. Id. at 555-56. The station attendant testified that the robber wore some "dingy 
colored tennis shoes." Id. at 556. Other witnesses for both parties reported that on the day 
of the robbery, the defendant wore black Army boots. Id. 
7
 Cases cited by defendant, see Aplt. Br. at 17-20, fail to demonstrate any legal 
relationship to this case. See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785-86 (reference to prior forgery 
committed against the defendant's sister plainly irrelevant to establish actual propensity 
to commit offenses against victim in that case); State v. Peterson, 722 P.2d 768, 769-70 
(Utah 1986) (error to elicit testimony of alleged prior felonies unsupported by 
corroborating evidence); Troy, 688 P.2d at 485-86 (multiple improper references to 
matters outside the evidence, including biased reference to legal name as an alias, 
unfounded allusion to the defendant's being in the Federal Witness Program, comparison 
to a notorious criminal, and suggestion that jury members consider and deliberate their 
unrelated personal experience); State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1983) 
(prosecutor's remarks that one defendant's receipt of income that should have been 
reported to the Social Security Administration was "double-dipping"and other 
defendants' signing and depositing paychecks for work evidently performed were 
variously irrelevant and inaccurate in prosecution for theft by deception unsupported by 
sufficient evidence); State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1981) (prosecutor's 
repeatedly admonished efforts to elicit post-arrest silence constituted fundamental error); 
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691-92 (Utah 1981) (prosecutor's deliberate fostering of 
false impression of crucial fact was reversible error). 
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In summation, the prosecutor attempted to minimize the apparent discrepancy in the 
testimony. Id. First, he stated to the jury that the attendant was terrified during the robbery, 
although the attendant did not testify that he was fearful. Id. at 556-57. Second, the 
prosecutor argued that the attendant could have mistaken the defendant's Army boots for 
tennis shoes under the station's fluorescent lights, although the attendant apparently did not 
specifically testify on that point. Id. at 556. The prosecutor also argued that the truck seen 
by the station attendant belonged to the defendant, even though the attendant did not identify 
the truck. Id. at 556 n.12. 
Enunciating the same principles as in Utah, that the prosecutor is "permitted . . . to 
draw reasonable inferences from evidence properly admitted in the case," the court rejected 
the defendant's claim that the prosecutor had gone beyond the evidence in summation. Id. 
at 556-57. The court found that although the station attendant did not testify that he was 
fearful, other witnesses noted his "shock and confusion" after the robbery. Id. at 557. 
Consequently, the prosecutor's assertions, that the attendant was fearful and had suffered a 
momentary lapse in his powers of observation, were "bona fide factual inferences." Id. The 
court reached the same conclusion with respect to the prosecutor's assertion about the 
attendant's identification of defendant's truck, where testimony of other witnesses placed it 
in the vicinity of the robbery. Id. at 557 n.12. 
In Salzman v. United States, 405 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the robbery victim 
informed police that one of his assailants wore a white T-shirt with a blue neck band. Id. at 
359-60. Police later found one of the co-defendants at a hospital, where they recalled seeing 
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a shirt that matched the victim's description. Id. at 360. The victim identified his assailant 
at the hospital, but police were unable to locate the T-shirt. Id. In closing, the prosecutor 
argued that the shirt described by the victim was the same shirt described by police officers 
at the hospital. Id. Notwithstanding the absence of the shirt, the D.C. Circuit rejected the 
claim that the prosecutor's argument was a "misstatement of the evidence." Id. The court 
stated, "[t]he record afforded a substantial evidentiary basis from which the prosecutor could 
predicate the argument as a matter of reasonable inference." Id. 
In Commonwealth v. Shea, 519 N.E.2d 1283 (Mass. 1988), the court found no 
substantial likelihood of injustice when the prosecutor, during closing, tapped together shoes 
seized from the defendant to demonstrate that the tapping noise was consistent with the 
testimony of a witness who heard a "clicking sound" from a person in the vicinity of the 
victim's apartment about the time of the murder. Id. at 1287. Nothing in the court's 
discussion indicated that the witness had first been questioned about whether the tapping 
sound demonstrated to the jury was the sound she actually heard on the night of the murder. 
Id. See also United States v. Nunan, 236 F.2d 576, 591 (2nd Cir. 1956) (in prosecution for 
income tax evasion, prosecutor fairly argued that $ 170,000 could not fit in $ 10 safe, although 
precise dimensions of safe were never proved). 
To the extent that defendant's claim focuses on the prosecutor's demonstration as an 
improper means of arguing a reasonable inference derived from the evidence, the claim is 
patently without merit. See People v. Caldaralla, 329 P.2d 137,145-46 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1958) (holding that prosecutor's use of investigator during closing argument to demonstrate 
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how victim was shot on the floor was proper and "supported] " by the evidence); Perry v. 
State, 552 S.E.2d 798,800 (Ga. 2001) (approving prosecutor's demonstration during closing 
of execution-style shooting using co-counsel as prop, where demonstration "merely 
illustrated what was before the jury" through forensic and photographic evidence and 
"consistent" with defendant's description); Commonwealth v. Nol, 652 N.E.2d 898, 898-89 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (per curiam) (holding proper prosecutor's covering his face with his 
handkerchief to demonstrate to jury what witnesses to armed robbery saw, notwithstanding 
that robber's handkerchief was evidently not recovered); Brown v. State, 111 P.2d 1355, 
1358 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (holding that prosecutor who used a police officer during 
closing to demonstrate position of victim in chair when shot in the neck was not so 
prejudicial as to require reversal). 
In the present case, the prosecutor's demonstration was a reasonable inference 
consistent with the facts presented at trial. The victim's first description of her assailant was 
the his face was "covered in black" and that she thought she saw his teeth (R. 167:46). She 
also told a police officer shortly after the assault that defendant had worn a black knit ski 
mask with one mouth and two eye holes (R. 167:46, 84). Yet, police only found a black knit 
cap and a blue and white checkered bandana in defendant's vehicle; they never found a black 
knit ski mask (R. 168:42,66,176). The cap and bandanna were admitted into evidence, as 
obviously relevant to demonstrate that defendant possessed items that could be used to cover 
his face, in a manner consistent with the victim's impressions of what she saw (R. 133; 
168:147-49; 169:82-83). Also, given that defendant was back-lit and his attack sudden, the 
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bandanna's checkered pattern reasonably suggested the appearance of "teeth." Thus, the 
prosecutor's demonstration was not "new evidence," but an inference that was entirely-
consistent with both the victim's testimony and the evidentiary purpose of the cap and 
bandana. Indeed, defense counsel inadvertently identified the knit cap and bandanna with 
the unrecovered ski mask when he elicited from Detective Croyle on cross-examination that 
those items served to support the issuance of the search warrant (R. 168:169-70).8 
The demonstration also properly rebutted defense counsel's arguments during closing 
that the police never found a black ski mask. That the victim never affirmed the possibility 
that her attacker could have been wearing a cap and bandana is irrelevant. See England, 376 
S.E.2d 556-57; Salzman, 405 F.2d at 360; Shea, 519 N.E.2d at 1287. Her first description 
8
 On cross-examination, Detective Croyle responded to defense counsel's 
questions about the issuance of the search warrant as follows: 
Q [John Caine, defense counsel]: [T]he person who's writing the affidavit 
believes that certain types of evidence may be found in the vehicle, 
right? 
A [Detective Croyle]: Yes. 
Q: And those things specifically are: . . . a black ski mask with eye holes, 
right? 
A: Yes, that's what puts [sic] down as certain property or evidence 
described as. 
Q: Right. Now, we already knew because you'd seen them even before 
this, that from the defendant's vehicle, this same vehicle, had 
been recovered a knit hat, a bandana . . . . 
(R. 168:169-70) (emphasis added). 
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of her attacker at trial was that his face was covered in black. The prosecution properly 
demonstrated during rebuttal how the cap and bandana possessed by defendant could be used 
to cover his face in black and might have suggested his teeth. 
In sum, the prosecutor's demonstration during closing argument was not improper, 
but a reasonable inference, based on the victim's testimony and properly admitted evidence, 
that the cap and bandanna found in defendant's vehicle was the facial covering worn by 
defendant during the burglary. Therefore, the trial court would not have been put on notice, 
let alone obvious notice, that it should intervene. In any event, as explained in Point II.B, 
infra, defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the demonstration. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED HIS 
PLAIN ERROR CLAIM THAT THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY 
MENTIONED MIKAELA'S INJURIES FROM DRINKING SODIUM 
HYDROXIDE, THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER 
IT; ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS IN LIGHT OF VERY 
COMPELLING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GUILT 
Defendant claims plain error in allowing testimony and the prosecutor's references 
in closing argument regarding Mikaela' s drinking sodium hydroxide from the Gatorade bottle 
left in Alicia's bedroom. He asserts those references were made to besmirch his character 
in violation of rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, by suggesting he was responsible for an 
uncharged assault. Aplt. Br. at 12-13, 23-24. The Court should decline to review the claim 
because it is inadequately briefed. Even a cursory analysis reveals that the evidence relating 
to the drain cleaner was significant to prove the crucial issue of defendant's identity as the 
victim's assailant. Additionally, even if allowing the prosecutor's demonstration and 
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testimony and comments regarding Mikaela's ingestion of liquid sodium hydroxide 
constituted error, these were not plain errors, nor prejudicial given compelling evidence of 
guilt. 
A. Because defendant inadequately briefed his claim, 
the Court should decline to consider it. 
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not 
adequately briefed." State v. Thomas , 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998) (citing State v. 
Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989) (declining to rule on issue where defendant's brief 
"wholly lacked legal analysis and authority to support his argument")); (also citing State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to rule on separation of powers 
argument where argument was not supported by any legal analysis or authority)). "'[A] 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited 
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research.'" State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2,^11, 974 P.2d 269 (quoting State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)). "When determining whether a party has adequately 
briefed an issue, this court looks to rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. . . . 
This rule prescribes that arguments in an appellant's brief 'shall contain the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, 
and parts of the record relied on.'" Id. at f^ 12. 
As this Court recently noted, the Utah Supreme Court has established a three-part 
process for evaluating the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence. State v. Holbert, 2002 UT 
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App 426, U 30, 61 P.3d 291 (citing State v.Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, t 18, 6 P.3d 
1120): 
[T]he trial court must first* determine whether the bad acts evidence is being 
offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as one of those specifically 
listed in rule 404(b). . . . Second, the court must determine whether the bad 
acts evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, which permits admission of 
only relevant evidence— Finally, the trial court must determine whether the 
bad acts evidence meets the requirements of rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, flf 18-20. 
Additionally, because defendant failed to object at trial, he must meet the 
requirements of the plain error exception by showing "(0 an error exists; (ii) the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. 
Defendant has entirely failed to analyze his rule 404(b) claim under the standards set 
out in Nelson-Waggoner, or under the plain error standards set out in Dunn. Defendant's 
argument consists only of a statement that the prosecutor elicited testimony from "several" 
witnesses that Mikaela drank some sodium hydroxide from a Gatorade bottle and "repeatedly 
referred to this incident in his closing argument, inferring that defendant was responsible for 
the act." Aplt. Br. at 12-13. Thereafter, defendant recites that portion of rule 404(b), and 
an excerpt from State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 25, 992 P.2d 951 (Utah 1999), 
admonishing against the use of prior bad acts to improperly introduce character evidence. 
This is followed by a two-sentence paraphrase of his complaint and a bare statement of the 
plain error standard. Aplt. Br. at 23-24. 
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Defendant has done nothing more than introduce his claim of error. He does not 
include a single record cite to support the alleged frequency of witness testimony and 
prosecutorial comment on the issue. He makes no argument that reference to uncharged 
conduct is per se improper. He does not discuss any of the factors set out in Nelson-
Waggoner to establish a rule 404(b) violation. Particularly, defendant omits any 
acknowledgment under rule 402 that the sodium hydroxide evidence was crucial to and 
instrumental in identifying him in a case in which identification was the only genuine issue.9 
He also omits any probative-value-versus-prejudice analysis under rule 403.l0 He makes no 
effort to show how any error could have been "plain." Particularly, defendant fails to 
discuss (1) that Mikaela's drinking the sodium hydroxide solution was necessary foundation 
9
 To satisfy the second Nelson-Waggoner prong, a defendant must show that the 
alleged prior bad act evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, which permits 
admission of only relevant evidence. Relevant evidence is "evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah 
R. Evid. 401. "Thus, if prior bad acts evidence 'tends to prove some fact that is material 
to the crime charged,' it is relevant and admissible under rule 402." Nelson-Waggoner, 
2000 UT 59, f 19 (quoting State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ^  22, 993 P.2d 837, cert 
denied, 528 U.S. 1164, 120 S. Ct. 1181 (2000)). 
10
 "Rule 403 excludes relevant evidence 'if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.'" Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ^ | 20 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 
403). "To determine whether prior bad acts evidence is admissible under rule 403, 'a 
variety of matters must be considered, including the strength of the evidence as to the 
commission of the other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the interval of time 
that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative 
proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility.'" Id. (quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988) (quotations 
and citation omitted)). 
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for that obviously relevant evidence, since it would almost certainly never have been 
discovered if she had not drunk it, and (2) that after hearing of his wife's beating, defendant's 
distinctively greater upset upon hearing that Mikaela had been hospitalized was important 
to impeaching him about having genuine concern for Alicia (R. 168:80, 125, 132-33). In 
sum, because defendant has so substantially failed to apply criteria relevant to the disposition 
of his claim, this Court should decline to address it.11 
In any event, defendant has not demonstrated prejudice as required by the plain error 
doctrine in the prosecutor's face mask demonstration or in eliciting testimony and 
commenting on Mikaela's ingesting caustic "Gatorade." 
11
 Because of defendant's substantial failure to adequately brief this issue the State 
declines to develop a full-blown rule 404(b) analysis. A cursory discussion, however, of 
Mikaela's drinking a caustic substance from the Gatorade bottle and suffering burns 
shows that evidence was properly admitted, not for the purpose of disparaging 
defendant's character, but to prove his identity as Alicia's assailant. Moreover, the record 
shows that the prosecutor elicited only such testimony of Mikaela's injuries that would 
provide a context for linking him to the uniquely incriminating Gatorade evidence. 
Alicia testified that at the time of the attack there was no Gatorade in the 
apartment, including the bedroom, and that she had not purchased Gatorade for six 
months (R. 167:67-68). When given the "Gatorade" to satisfy her thirst, Mikaela had a 
violent physical reaction, which led to her hospitalization (R. 168:20-22). Based on the 
burns to Mikaela's mouth and throat, doctors thought the Gatorade bottle contained a 
caustic substance like Drano (R. 168:129). The State's expert confirmed that the 
Gatorade bottle contained sodium hydroxide, a caustic substance common to drain 
cleaners (R. 169:38, 41, 60). He also confirmed that the bottle of Red Devil Lye found in 
defendant's vehicle contained the identical substance (R. 169:41-42). Defendant's 
adamant and repeated denials to Detective Croyle within hours of the burglary, but just 
before the lye was found, that he had any Drano-type substance, only increased the 
relevance of the Gatorade evidence because it tended to expose a patently guilty 
conscious (R. 168:112, 129-32). In closing, the prosecutor never referred to Mikaela's 
injuries. Rather, in accord with the State's theory of the case, the prosecutor referred to 
Mikaela only to place in context the uniquely identifying sodium hydroxide evidence and 
to impeach defendant on his professed concern for Alicia (R. 170:14, 50). 
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B. Any error was harmless because evidence of guilt was very compelling. 
Defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claims fail under the plain error doctrine 
because he fails to show that absent the alleged misconduct the outcome at trial would have 
been different. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ^ 22 (prosecutorial misconduct); Parker, 2000 UT 51, \ 
7 (plain error). "[S]tep two of the prosecutorial misconduct test requires 'consideration of 
the circumstances of the case as a whole. In making such a consideration, it is appropriate 
to look at the evidence of defendant's guilt/" 91 P.2d 925, 931 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting 
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486). Thus, "'[i]f proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged 
conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial."' Id. (quoting Troy, 688 P.2d at 486) 
(additional citation omitted). 
Evidence of defendant's guilt was very compelling. 
Alicia's identification of defendant as her assailant 
Following the attack, Alicia immediately called the police and identified defendant, 
her husband, as her assailant (R. 167:62). She based this belief on the similarity of 
defendant's and her assailant's "size, stature, and build (both about 6f2M and 160 pounds) - -
"[w]hen you've been married to someone for so long you just know" (R. 167:49-50,94,130). 
Alicia also believed defendant was her assailant because of the difficulties they were having 
over custody of their children - - "I felt he was the only one capable of doing something like 
that to me" - - and she had no enemies (R. 167:95-96). 
Similarity of clothing worn by defendant and assailant 
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Alicia testified that her assailant was dressed in black - a black sweatshirt, black 
pants, "face covered in black," but wearing white Reebok tennis shoes with blue trim (R. 
167:46,53-54,91-95). Defendant acknowledged that he had gone to work the day before the 
assault wearing black jeans and Reebok tennis shoes with blue trim (R. 169:147-48; State's 
Ex. 24). During the search, Officer Trujillo recovered from defendant's vehicle a black knit 
cap, a blue and white checkered bandana, and a pair of blue and white Reebok tennis shoes, 
all of which defendant acknowledged as his own (R. 168:42, 50-51; 169-147-49). Officer 
Trujillo also noticed, but did not seize, a black hooded sweatshirt in defendant's apartment 
(R. 168:52). 
The Gatorade/Red Devil lye connection 
A Gatorade bottle was found in the victim's bedroom immediately after the burglary 
(R. 168:20). Alicia testified that there was no Gatorade in the either the bedroom or the 
apartment and that none had been purchased for six months prior to the incident (167:67-68). 
A bottle of Red Devil Lye was found in defendant's vehicle only hours after the burglary (R. 
168:202). Both bottles contained sodium hydroxide (R. 169:38-42). Defendant repeatedly 
and adamantly denied having the caustic substance before its discovery in his vehicle (R. 
168:112, 129-32). 
Defendant's admission to foster care worker 
Betty Meyer, foster care worker with the Division of Child and Family Services, 
testified that she interviewed defendant on May 31, 2001, several weeks after the assault 
(169:72-74). During the interview, defendant remarked about Alicia's accusing him of being 
28 
her assailant, stating, "[Sjomeone came in with a mask and attackedf Alicia], she's saying 
it was me, but she never saw me" (R. 169:78). Based on defendant's tone of voice and 
agitated state, Ms. Meyer clearly understood defendant to mean that Alicia correctly accused 
him even though she was unable to see through his disguise (R. 169:77-78). 
Defendant fs patently false and incriminating alibi 
Chevron/Diet Coke story. Officer Secrist arrived at defendant's residence at about 
5:50 a.m., took defendant into custody, and transported him directly to the Ogden Police 
Station for questioning. In the brief period following the assault, defendant told her that he 
had purchased some Diet Coke at a Chevron station sometime before 4:00 a.m. (R. 168: 78-
83, 101-03). Defendant stated that the Chevron he went to was located at 12th Street and 
Harrison, specifically indicating that it was the Chevron located adjacent to the Ogden Clinic 
and the Smith's Food King (R. 168:83-86). During his interview immediately afterward with 
Detective Croyle, defendant reaffirmed purchasing the Diet Coke at the drive-up window at 
the same Chevron, though he now indicated that it might have been as late as 5:00 a.m. and 
he could not remember the clerk's gender (R. 168:125-26). He also provided a precise 
description of the route he took to reach the Chevron: a right turn from 484 Eccles 
(defendant's residence) onto Harrison, south on Harrison to 12th Street, right (west) on 12th 
Street followed by a turn into the Chevron located near the Ogden Clinic and the Smith's 
Food King (R. 168:125-26,136-39). Defendant also described what bills he used to pay for 
the Diet Coke and the change he received (R. 168:136-37). 
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However, the manager of that Chevron station test: fied that her location did not open 
until 5:30 a.m., that she had been alone on duty at that time and did not recall selling any Diet 
Coke between 5:30 and 5:45 a.m., and that the store's register tape showed no sale had been 
made before 5:46 a.m., nearly the same time police encountered defendant exiting his 
residence (R. 168:39, 45, 139, 193-95). To escape the blatant inconsistency in his story, 
defendant claimed at trial that he instead went to the 24-hour Chevron at 21st and Harrison 
in Ogden (R. 169:140, 143-44). However, photographs supported Detective Croyle's 
testimony that that Chevron does not have a drive-through window, and Officer Trujillo 
confirmed that defendant did not appear in that Chevron's surveillance video from 3:00 a.m. 
to 5:35 a.m. (R. 168:55-56; 169:97). 
• The hot engine. Soon after his arrest, defendant told Officer Secrist that after 
buying a Diet Coke at a local Chevron station, he returned to his residence at about 4:00 a.m., 
watched a videotape of "Independence Day," arose to shower at about 5:30 a.m, and then 
encountered the police as he was leaving the house, moments before 6:00 a.m. (R. 168:83-84, 
101-03). Thus, defendant implicitly asserted that he had not driven his car for almost two 
hours. However, when Officer Trujillo arrived at 5:46 a.m., the hood of defendant' car was 
so hot that he could not leave his hand on it and the engine was making popping noises, all 
indicating it had been driven recently (R. 168:41 -42). A Toyota auto technician testified that 
a pinging noise is common as an engine cools, usually lasting no more than fifteen minutes 
after a car is driven (R. 169:218-19). He also stated that a recently-driven vehicle will have 
a warm hood for no longer than half an hour (R. 169:220). 
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• The purported trip to wort Defendant also claimed that on the morning of May 11, 
he was on his way to work and that the trip was about thirty to thirty-five minutes long (R. 
169:13405, 144, 149-50,210-211). The facts belied defendant's story. Officer Trujillo 
arrived at defendant's residence at 5:46 a.m. and moments later observed defendant exit the 
house, purportedly on his way to work (R. 168:39, 45, 77, 84). However, at Detective 
Croyle's request, another officer drove from defendant's residence to defendant's place of 
employment by four different, explicitly outlined routes between 4:55 a.m. and 5:44 a.m. (R. 
169:227-28). The officer obeyed all traffic regulations, although at times he drove as much 
as 15 miles per hour above the speed limit (R. 169:233, 235). The greatest travel time was 
only five minutes and thirty seconds (R. 169:231-32). On cross-examination, defendant was 
bound to admit that at no time in the two months preceding May 11 did he ever report to 
work before 7:00 a.m. (R. 169:196-99). 
Defendant's lack of credibility on the witness stand 
When the police first encountered defendant he and informed him that he was under 
arrest, he reacted "nonchalantly]" and immediately asserted that his wife was "always 
calling the police on him" (R. 168:46, 78). However, on cross-examination, the prosecutor 
confronted defendant with Ogden City police records (R. 169:187-89). Those records 
identified only two relevant calls from Alicia, a request to keep the peace in March 2001 and 
a report of custodial interference when defendant kept the couple's children longer than 
agreed on in a temporary court order (R. 169:188-89). 
Trial court rs denial of defendant *s motion to dismiss 
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Defendant moved to dismiss the charges at the close of the State's case-in-chief (R. 
169:87-91). The motion was partly grounded on law enforcement's failure to find the face 
mask described by the victim (R. 169:89). Based on the victim's "strong familiarity with the 
defendant" and a "lot of other [circumstantial] evidence that surely [ties defendant to the 
crime]," the trial court denied the motion, finding there was "ample evidence for this jury to 
return a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 169:92). By not challenging the trial 
court's denial of his motion to dismiss, defendant has implicitly acquiesced in the trial court's 
ruling, which is entitled to some deference. See State v. Clark, 2001UT 9, f 13,20 P.3d 300 
("We will uphold the trial court's decision to submit a case to the jury '"if, upon reviewing 
the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, the court concludes that 
some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime 
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt."'") (citations omitted). 
Based on this compelling evidence of defendant's guilt, any error was harmless.12 
12
 Defendant also argues that the same alleged errors forming the basis of his plain 
error/prosecutorial misconduct claims also constitute ineffective assistance of counsel and 
cumulative error. Aplt. Br. at 24-27. To show his counsel's deficient performance, 
defendant "must show that in failing to object to the prosecutor's remarks, his counsel's 
performance 'fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment."' 
Calliham, 2002 UT 86, U 62 (quoting State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998)). 
Because the prosecutor did not conduct himself improperly, defendant has failed to show 
that his counsel performed deficiently. See State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 34, 989 P.2d 
52 ("[F]ailure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised 
does not constitute ineffective assistance.") (quotations and citations omitted). Similarly, 
defendant has failed to show there was error under the cumulative error doctrine. 
Additionally, because claims of ineffective assistance and cumulative error, like plain 
error, require that defendant show that any error was harmful, defendant's additional 
claims also fail. See id. (equating prejudice prongs of plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims) (citations omitted); State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ]f 44, 994 
P.2d 177 (reversing under cumulative error doctrine "only if the cumulative effect of the 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. , 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _£ day of May, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
/ 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
several errors undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had") (citations 
omitted). 
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